THE INTERACTION OF HYDROGEN JET RELEASES WITH WALLS AND BARRIERS Willoughby, D.B. Royle, M.

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ABSTRACT

It has been suggested that separation or safety distances for pressurised hydrogen storage can be reduced by the inclusion of walls or barriers between the hydrogen storage and vulnerable plant or other items. Various NFPA codes (1) suggest the use of 60° inclined fire barriers for protection against jet flames in preference to vertical ones.

This paper describes a series of experiments performed in order to compare the performance of 60° barriers with that of 90° barriers. Their relative efficiency at protecting from thermal radiation and blast overpressure was measured together with the propensity for the thermal radiation and blast overpressure to be reflected back to the source of the leak.

The work was primarily focused on compressed H_2 storage for stationary fuel cell systems, which may be physically separated from a fuel cell system or could be on board such a system. Different orifice sizes were used to simulate different size leaks and all releases were made were from storage at 200 bar.

Overall conclusions on barrier performance were made based on the recorded measurements.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this work is to provide data on the effectiveness of barrier walls at preventing radiation and physical transport of fire from hydrogen jet flames. The results could be used to inform safety distances for hydrogen storage at fuel cell installations. Using high-pressure release scenarios, the effectiveness of barriers at preventing physical fire spread, radiative heat flux and blast overpressure were investigated.

The work was primarily focused on compressed H_2 on site storage and compression, which may be physically separated from a fuel cell system or could be on board such a system.

The effectiveness of 90 and 60° barriers were investigated and compared with results for free jets.

The possibility of using a risk based approach to installation and siting of stationary fuel cell systems depends upon availability of data and guidance on hazards and probabilities of occurrence. Such guidance data is readily available for most common hydrocarbon fuels. For hydrogen however data is required on the hazards associated with different release scenarios. This data can then be related to the probability of different types of scenarios (from historical fault data) to allow safety distances to be defined and controlled using different techniques. Some data on releases has started to appear but this data generally relates to hydrogen vehicle refuelling systems that are designed for larger throughput, higher pressure and generally use larger pipe diameters than are likely to be used for small fuel cell systems (2).

2.0 TEST FACILITY AND SET-UP

2.1 Test facility

- The main test facility comprised a purpose-built concrete pad, measuring some 10 m x 10 m inset in a 24 m x 18 m tarmac pad
- Screw air compressor and associated air drying equipment
- Air operated gas booster to compress hydrogen
- Two 50 litre storage vessels capable of storing hydrogen at pressure up to 1000 bar
- Pipe work and remotely operated valves to deliver hydrogen to the release point
- Local (15 m from the firing pad) instrument cabin containing the signal conditioning units and data logging system and control plc
- Remote control room (300 m from the firing pad) with video displays of the trials area and the networked control system.
- The release point was situated at 1.2 m above the ground and the ignition point was located between
- 2m and 10 m from the release point depending on the experiment taking place. The release area is illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Release area

2.2 Gas supply

A gas booster was used to charge the two storage vessels with hydrogen to the required release pressure. The hydrogen was delivered to the release point via stainless steel tubing having an internal diameter of 11.9 mm. A series of ball valves was used to control the release; these valves had an internal bore of 9.5 mm. The final release valve was fitted with a modified pneumatic actuator to provide rapid opening and closing of the valve. A simplified schematic of the release system is shown in Figure .2.



Figure 2. Simplified schematic of the release system

2.3 Release configuration

Releases of hydrogen were made both with and without flow restrictors in place. The flow restrictors were simple orifices having diameters of 6.4 and 3.2 mm. The flow restrictors consisted of a stainless steel insert 12 mm long with various bores; these were inserted within a modified fitting immediately upstream of the final release valve. All of the release functions were controlled remotely.

2.4 Ignition systems

A pyrotechnic ignition system was used which consisted of a match head igniter, which contained a small amount of pyrotechnic material. The ignition was automatically triggered at a predetermined time during the release by the control system PLC.

2.5 Barrier configuration

The barriers were constructed of 1.6 mm sheet steel supported on a frame the dimensions were 3.0 m wide x 2.4 m high. The frames were anchored using a 1 tonne concrete block. The jet stand off was 2.6 m and the jet impacted at the centre of the barrier.

3.0 EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENTS

The following experimental measurements were made:

Overpressure measurement - Two types of pressure sensors were deployed. Kulite ETL-345F-375M Series 40 bara piezo-resistive transducers were used to measure the 'higher' reflected overpressures in the wall and Kulite ETS-IA-375M 17 bara piezo-resistive sensors were used to measure all other overpressures.

The high-pressure Kulite gauges were 40 bar gauges with the data logging amplification set for a 16 bar range with a measurement error of \pm 8 mbar. They were factory fitted with shields to protect the sensors against heat and flash light. The lower pressure Kulite gauges were 17 bar gauges with the data-logging amplification set for a 4 bar range. The 17 bar Kulite sensors were factory fitted with an ablative coating to protect the sensors against heat and flash light. All the piezo-resistive sensors were mounted, pointing upwards (except for the wall mounted sensors), in specially made streamlined blocks. Sensors were mounted on blocks fixed into a short length of scaffolding, which were bolted into a standard floor fitting fixed to the ground. Sensors were mounted on blocks fixed into the wall.



Figure 3(a) Kulite on pole

Figure 3(b) Kulite in wall

Heat flux - measurements were made using fast response (50 ms) ellipsoidal radiometers.

Visual records - video records were made at 25 frames per second.

Meteorological measurements - The air temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction were measured at the instrument cabin 10m from the pad using an FT Technologies ultra-sonic anemometer and a Vector Instruments weather station. This comprised wind speed; wind direction, temperature and humidity measurement mounted 3.5 m above the ground. The instruments were connected to the data-logging equipment, allowing recording of the weather conditions to be made during the trials. The data obtained is only indicative, i.e. the instruments were not specifically calibrated for these trials.

4.0 RELEASE SEQUENCE OPERATION

The valve and ignition timing were performed in an automated release sequence by the PLC. The following variables can be set on the system:

Release duration – This is the length of time the valve open signal is present at the output and can be set between 0 and 60 000 ms

Ignition delay - This is the time at which the ignition pulse occurs relative to the valve open signal, i.e. a delay of 0 ms will result in the valve open signal and the ignition pulse occurring at the same time. This can be set between minus 10 000 and plus 60 000 ms.

5.0 TEST CONFIGURATIONS

5.1 Barriers

Two barrier configurations were tested; a 60° barrier see Figure 3.1(a) and a 90° barrier see Figure 3.1(b) A test without a barrier was also performed for comparison purposes.





Figure 4(a) 60° barrier



5.2 Tests Performed

All the tests were performed with hydrogen released at 200 bar horizontally towards the barrier. Six tests were conducted with three different size orifices (three onto a 60° barrier and three onto 90° barrier). A single ignition position, 2 m from the release point and at a height of 1.2 m was chosen. A single ignition delay of 800 ms and a jet stand off of 2.6 m was used for all the tests. A 9.5 mm orifice test was conducted without a barrier in place for comparison purposes.

5.3 Pressure sensors and heat flux meters (60° barrier)

The pressure sensors were positioned in front; behind and directly opposite the barrier. The heat flux meters were positioned to the side, top and behind the barrier. Exact locations are shown in figure 5. Photographs of the sensors are shown at 5(b) and 5(c).



SIDE ELEVATION





Figure 5(b) Sensors in front of barrier and relative to Figure 5(c) Sensors at the back of barrier the wall

5.4 Pressure sensors and heat flux meters (90° barrier)

The pressure sensors were positioned in front, behind and directly opposite the barrier. The heat flux meters were positioned to the side, top and behind the barrier. Exact locations are shown in figure 6(a).



SIDE ELEVATION

Figure 6(a) Sensor positions (pressure and heat flux) for the 90° barrier A photograph of the sensors is shown at 6(b).



Figure 6(b) Sensor locations relative to 90° barrier and wall

6. RESULTS

6.1 Comparison of overpressures measured for releases against a 60° barrier and a 90° barrier

The maximum overpressures for all tests were recorded on sensor 12, which was located in the wall.

Table 1 gives the maximum overpressures recorded for the 60° and 90° barriers (wall and ground sensors) and with the varying range of restrictors.

Overpressure measurements were made on a free jet (no barrier) for comparison purposes.

Orifice	Max overpressure		Max overpressure		Max	Max
diameter	(bar)		(bar)		overpressure	overpressure
(mm)					(bar) without	(bar) without
	Wall		Ground		barrier	barrier
					Ground	Wall
	90°	60°	90°	60°		
	Barrier	Barrier	Barrier	Barrier		
3.2	0.041	0.086	0.033	0.029	0.025	0.035
6.4	0.315	0.438	0.204	0.200	0.191	0.152
9.5	0.422	0.572	0.224	0.288	0.239	0.165

Table 1 Maximum overpressures for 60° and 90° barriers





Figure 7(a) Pressure v time for releases against 90° barrier (wall sensors)

The pressure versus time traces (maximum overpressure) recorded in the wall with the varying restrictors 3.2, 6.4 and 9.5 mm can be seen at figures 7(a) and 7(b) for the 90° and 60° barrier.



Pressure (wall transducers) v time for 3.2, 6.4 and 9.5 mm restrictor

Figure 7(b) Pressure v time for releases against 60° barrier (wall sensors)

6.2 Comparison of heat flux measured for releases against a 60° barrier and a 90° barrier

Heat flux measurements were made on a free jet (no barrier) for comparison purposes. Two sensors were deployed, one at 2.6 m and one at 5.2 m from the release point, (height 1.0 m and 1.5 m from the centre line of jet). The second sensor was placed such that it measured the heat flux from the free jet in the absence of the barrier.

Table 2 gives the heat flux recorded for the tests conducted with the varying range of orifices. The position of the heat flux meters are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2

HF1 behind barrier HF2 front side of barrier

HF4 behind barrier HF3 top of barrier

Heat flux sensor	Radiative heat flux Kw/m ² 3.2 mm restrictor		Radiative heat flux Kw/m ² 6.4 mm restrictor		Radiative heat flux Kw/m ² 9.5 mm restrictor		Radiative heat flux Kw/m ² 6.4 mm restrictor Free Jet
	90°	60°	90°	60°	90°	60°	
	barrie	barrie	barrier	barrie	barrier	barrier	
	r	r		r			
HF1	3.85	6.68	4.11	37.5	9.05	27.8	
HF2	39.9	36.7	73.3	82.2	125.7	60.1	65.8
HF3	7.25	43.8	30.0	109.0	32.3	84.9	
HF4	1.72	6.06	7.43	15.0	5.39	11.6	68.5

Table 2 Heat flux recorded with the varying range of orifices

Maximum heat flux measurements for 60° barrier - 6.4 mm restrictor



Figure 8(a) Heat flux (top of barrier) v time for releases against 60° barrier



Maximum heat flux measurements for 90° barrier - 9.5 mm restrictor

Figure 8(b) Heat flux (top of barrier) v time for releases against 90° barrier

6.3 Photographic images

Images of the release impacting onto the barriers with the 3.2mm and 9.5mm orifices can be seen in figures 9(a) and 9(b).





Release onto 90° barrier with 3.2 mm restrictor

Release onto 60° barrier with 3.2 mm restrictor

Figure 9(a) Release onto barriers with 6.4 mm restrictor



Release onto 90° barrier with 9.5 mm restrictor



Release onto 60° barrier with 9.5 mm restrictor

Figure 9(b) Release onto barriers with a 9.5 mm restrictor

7. DISCUSSION

7.1 Comparison of overpressures with and without barriers

In these tests considerably higher overpressures were measured in the wall for tests with barriers than for those without e.g. 0.572 bar with a barrier and 0.165 bar without a barrier.

While barriers can prevent impingement of flame on the surroundings and has been used as such (see 3 & 4) barriers can create turbulence within the hydrogen jet and this may result in higher overpressures being generated compared with free jets. However, for 9.5 mm jets a significant increase in overpressure due to the presence of the barrier was only seen on the reflected wave.

Higher overpressures were measured on the jet impact side of the barrier, which could have an effect on the integrity of any equipment located in this area. However, overpressures measured behind the barrier were significantly reduced.

Orifice diameter (mm)	Max overpressure (bar)						
	Front of 60° barrier	Behind 60° barrier	Front of 90° barrier	Behind 90° barrier	Without barrier		
					Ground		
9.5	0.288	0.094	0.222	0.089	0.239		

Table 3 Non-reflected overpressures in front and behind barrier

7.2 Comparison of overpressures between 60° and 90° barriers

Comparing the overpressures measured on the ground there is little difference in maximum overpressures (in front) between a 60° and a 90° barrier. The highest overpressure measured was seen on sensor 12 located at the bottom of the wall and with the 60° barrier (0.572 bar). This is probably due to the shorter distance (when compared with 90° barrier) from the base of the barrier to the base of the wall. Table 3 compares the overpressures in front of and behind the wall for the 60° and the 90° barriers.

Orifice	Max overpress	ure (bar)	Max overpress	Max overpressure (bar)		
diameter	Front of 60°	Behind 60°	Front of 90°	Behind 90°		
(mm)	barrier	barrier	barrier	barrier		
3.2	0.041	0.016	0.029	0.012		
6.4	0.200	0.070	0.188	0.045		
9.5	0.288	0.094	0.222	0.089		

Table 4 Comparison of overpressures between 60 and 90° barrier

7.3 Comparison of heat flux measured between 60° and 90° barriers

The 60° barrier resulted in more heat flux being transmitted over the top of the barrier for all restrictor sizes than that for the 90° barrier e.g. for the 6.4 mm restrictor test 60° barrier gave 109 kW/m² compared to 30 kW/m² for the 90° barrier. The sensor located at the side of the barrier measured similar heat fluxes for both 60 and 90 ° barriers in the 3.2 and the 6.4 mm restricted tests. However for the 9.5 mm test significantly more heat flux was measured at this position with the 90° barrier (125.7 kW/m²) i.e. twice as much as for the 60° barrier (60.1 kW/m²).

The 60° barrier results in significantly more heat flux behind the barrier than for a 90° barrier, up to three times as much for a 9.5 mm restrictor release.

8. CONCLUSIONS

(1) The 60° barrier results in more heat flux behind the barrier (up to 3 times more).

(2) The 90° barrier results in more heat flux in front of barrier - twice the magnitude of that for the 60° barrier.

(3) The 60° barrier results in more heat flux being transmitted around the barrier, a significant reduction in the overpressure produced compared to the 90 ° barrier was not observed.

(4) The only advantage in using a 60° barrier in preference to a 90° barrier is there is less heat flux reflected back to the leak source.

9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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