

Assessment of Safety for HFCV

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Korea Transportation Safety Authority Korea Automobile Testing and Research Institute (KATRI)





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Conclusions









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Hydrogen leakage Simulation System



Hydrogen Sensors and Hydrogen Leakage Location



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Hydrogen leakage Test





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Test Result at rest (underbody)

누출위치		0.21	1 센서		2 센서		3 센서	
출위치 번호	방황	πð	센처	시간(초)	셴저	시간(초)	셴서	시간(초)
1	FB	10	24	11	25	15	32	16
		40	31	2	23	3	20	12
		131	31	2	19	4	23	5
	RR	10	27	6	32	7	25	23
		40	27	3	25	8	26	11
		131	27	2	26	5	25	5
	LH	10	24	12	32	30	26	41
		40	23	2	20	4	24	7
		131	23	2	20	3	31	4
2 -	FR	10	31	8	20	8	21	10
		40	31	12	20	13	21	17
		131	18	12	21	14	30	14
	RB	10	24	9	32	17	25	17
		40	23	2	32	4	25	5
		131	23	2	25	3	32	3
3	FR	10	21	11	20	19	24	22
		40	21	8	20	10	31	14
		131	20	5	31	5	24	10
4 -	FB	10	23	11	24	39	32	48
		40	19	1	31	2	20	8
		131	31	2	19	2	20	4
	RR	10	23	5				
		40	32	3	27	4		
		131	27	3	32	3	25	4
5	FB	10	32	3	27	10	24	15
		40	32	2	25	2	24	4
		131	25	2	32	3	22	3
6	RH	10	20	13	21	18	31	19
		40	18	5	21	6	20	6
		131	18	3	21	3	20	4
7	LH	10	20	13	31	21	32	23
		40	20	19	31	21	19	24
		131	19	7	20	41	31	47
	BH	10	21	15	20	17	31	17
		40	31	6	20	7	22	8
		131	20	3	31	4	21	4
	RR	10	21	10	20	12	32	19
		40	19	2	31	2	20	3
		131	19	2	31	2	23	2
8	FR	10	19	4	31	15	20	17
		40	19	2	31	8	20	10
		131	19	2	23	4	31	5



Leakage Analysis for a moving vehicle

- when hydrogen leaks for a moving, the area of leakage exits hydrogen

H₂ Vol %

4.0 %

0.0

• when hydrogen leaks for a moving, Hydrogen leaked is diffusion to the outside by the outside air flow



Frontal Impact Test

□ Goals

 Verification of vehicle fuel system integrity, electrical safety and occupants safety

□ Test Vehicle

Fuel cell vehicle (SUV)



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Test Conditions

- KMVSS article 91, 102
 - : 48 km/h full frontal impact test with hybrid 111 50 %ile male dummies
- Filled with helium 90 % of normal working pressure (152 liter imes 31.5 MPa)
- During the crash, opened storage valve (severe condition)



Vehicle Operation Safety Frontal Impact Test : Locations of acceleration sensors FPS module Radiator fan motor Fuel cell stack Battery Air blower OVERALL LENGTH: 4323m Motor Storages FPS: Fuel Processing System Korea Transportation Safety Authority

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Frontal Impact Test : Acceleration Curves



Frontal Impact Test : Results

□ After frontal impact, no helium leakage

- High pressure sensor : 31.5 MPa
- Low pressure sensor : 0.8 MPa
- Even though FPS and stack were exposed to high acceleration(120~140 g), no helium leakage
- Met occupant safety requirements







Rear Impact Test

- Test Vehicle : SUV (2002kg)
- Test Condition : 48.1km/h, Moving barrier(1,805 kg)
- Test material and Pressure : Helium, high(33MPa)/Low(1MPa)
- Container Deformation sensors : 21 EA
- Locations of acceleration sensors : Body 3 EA / Container 4 EA
- Pressure sensors : High 1 / Low 1



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Rear Impact Test : Results



□ After frontal impact, no helium leakage

- High pressure sensor: 33 MPa
- Low pressure sensor: 1.0 MPa





Side Impact Test

- □ Goals
 - Verification of vehicle fuel system integrity, electrical safety and occupants safety

Test Vehicle

Fuel cell vehicle (SUV)



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Test Conditions

- KMVSS article 102
 - : 50 km/h side impact test with deformable moving barrier (950 kg)
- Filled with helium 90 % of normal working pressure (152 liter imes 31.5 MPa)
- During the crash, opened storage valve (severe condition)



S

Side Impact Test : Locations of acceleration sensors



Side Impact Test : Acceleration Curves



Side Impact Test : Results

□ After impact, no helium leakage

- High pressure sensor: 31.5 MPa
- Low pressure sensor: 0.8 MPa
- Met occupant safety requirements



Fail-safety Evaluation

Goals

Verification of the Acceleration Control System Safety _

Test Vehicle

Hybrid vehicle : Prius THS- II, Verna, NEV

Test Conditions

- KMVSS article 87 & Test Procedure 25
- Fail condition : the normal state by wire cutting or removing
- Prius : APS #1 GND, U-Phase Current Signal
 - Motor Temperature
- Verna : APS #1 GND, Resolver S1 Signal Motor Temperature





Prius THS || (EV driving)





- U-Phase Current Signal Failure
- o Idle Return Time : 0.04초
- Max Torque :208Nm , Current :138A

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Prius THS \parallel (EV driving)



Verna (HEV)





- APS 1 Gnd Failure
- **Idle Return Time : 0.22 sec**
- Max Torque :17Nm, Current :90A

- Resolver S1 Signal Failure
- Idle Return Time : 0.11초
- Max Torque : 11Nm , Current :50A





Verna (HEV)





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Post Crash : Frontal Impact

□ Insulation Resistance after Crash

- Traction battery ↔ vehicle body: 4.8 k Ω /V (req.: 100 Ω/V)
- Small amount of electrolyte spillage

□ Remarks

- Because frontal part of vehicle was severely damaged, accessibility for Insulation resistance measurement was poor
- Poor accessibility may lead to electric shock
- Need to specify measurement method of electrolyte spillage (7%, 5 liters) and electrical energy (within 0.2 Joules)











IN-USE : Direct Contact



IPXXD (Test wire)



IPXXB (Test finger)



(Bonnet)

> Test Results

- IPXXB, IPXXD Evaluation : Pass
 - · Passenger/ Luggage compartment
 - · Bonnet/Underneath
 - · Connectors
- Marking and Color orange





(Underneath)



(Luggage)



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IN-USE : Isolation Resistance





Test Results

- Minimum Value : 100 ohms/volt of the working voltage for DC buses
 500 ohms/volt of the working voltage for AC buses
 - lowest insulation resistance was between outer cover of stack and terminal of stack(-) : 1.28 kΩ/V





IN-USE : Indirect Contact

- Fest Results
 - Criteria : less than 100 m \mathcal{Q}
 - · High voltage box enclosure \leftrightarrow
 - Chassis : 5.4 $m\varOmega$
 - · Supercapacitor enclosure \leftrightarrow
 - Door hinge : 316.2 m \mathcal{Q}
 - · Supercapacitor enclosure \leftrightarrow

 $\text{Chassis}: \textbf{45.4} \ \textbf{m} \boldsymbol{\varOmega}$













Conclusion

Hydrogen Safety

- Conducted the Single Failure Conditions Test of Hydrogen Leakage
- Confirmation of proposed GTR Draft

□ Vehicle Operation Safety

- Conducted full scale vehicle frontal and side, rear impact tests
- No malfunction in vehicle fuel system integrity after impact tests
- Confirmation of proposed GTR Draft

□ Vehicle Electrical Safety

- In-use and post-crash, electrical isolation and electrical continuity met GTR
- In case of frontal post-crash, because of severe damage to frontal part of vehicle, it is not easy to measure electrical continuity

In this study, the main objective is to develop technology that the structure and equipment of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicles should meet the safety of the citizens to protect the lives such as hydrogen and high-voltage devices



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Thank you very much for your attention !

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